HOLDER: IRAN PLOTTED ATTACK ON US BASED DIPLOMATIC TARGETS
Yesterday's disclosure by the US Justice Department that the Iranian
government was actively involved in plotting terrorist attacks on American soil
has sent shock waves around the world. The plot, allegedly targeting Saudi
Arabian and Israeli diplomats and diplomatic facilities, is just the latest in a
series of Iranian actions that place it squarely outside of the norms of
international behavior.
As detailed in the criminal complaint made public yesterday, high level
officials in the Iranian government sought to enlist someone that they believed
to be a member of the Zetas, the notoriously violent Mexican drug cartel, to
assasinate Saudi Ambassador Adel al-Jubeir. The plot called for the assasination
to take place in a public, at a restaurant, where large numbers of American
citizens would have inevitably been casualties.
The audacity of the plan says a great deal about the worldview of the Iranian
regime, their intentions towards the United States, and the likelihood that
relations with the regime will ever by normalized. Diplomatic outreach has
yielded nothing of value to date, and the upper echelons of the Iranian regime
are intent on further degrading an already non-existant relationship.
We
here at Iran180 believe that this is yet another example of the Iranian regime's
true nature. We call on leaders from around the world to make it known to the
Iranian regime, through words and deeds, that this type of behavior is beyond
the pale.
Below, please find several pieces of insightful analysis into this fast
developing story
The extraordinary
detail of the alleged Iranian-backed plot to assassinate Saudi ambassador to the
United States Adel al-Jubeir, revealed today by Attorney General Eric Holder,
raises all sorts of questions. Why would Iran have wanted to carry out such a
killing here in the United States, where its "fingerprints" on such a plot would
have had -- indeed, will have -- such an impact on U.S. policy toward Iran?
If, as the now-unsealed amended complaint reveals, there had been "a hundred,
a hundred and fifty" people killed and injured, including "senators," there
would have been huge political pressure on the White House to order a
retaliatory military strike on Iran. An Iranian spokesman has responded by
rejecting the charges as a "ridiculous show" -- but will the Islamic Republic
persist in what certainly appears to be a newly aggressive policy?
And what will be the reaction of Saudi Arabia -- where Prince Nayef's
Interior Ministry last week warned rioting Saudi Shiites not to act "at the
behest of a foreign country" (code for Iran) and promised that Saudi Arabia
"would strike with an iron fist" against disaffected citizens to preserve the
"security and stability" of the kingdom. The news of the Iran plot may have
already driven the United States and Saudi Arabia closer together: King Abdullah
and Jubeir met with National Security Advisor Tom Donilon on Oct. 1 to discuss
"a number of issues of mutual interest" -- we now know what at least one of
those items must have been.
More trivially, one could facetiously point out that targeting Jubeir would
have been problematic because he often seems to be out of Washington. Indeed, he
seems to spend a huge amount of time back in Saudi Arabia, where he is King
Abdullah's favorite English-language translator.
And, the issue that will intrigue Washington society as well as its political
class: Which was the restaurant where Jubeir was going to be "hit" where he ate
"like two times a week," according to the indictment. My bet is on Cafe Milano
in Georgetown. It's known to be one of al-Jubeir's favorite haunts -- even if
prosciutto di parma and Pinot Grigio aren't obvious fare for a Saudi diplomat.
Simon Henderson is the Baker fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy
Policy Program at The Washington Institute
Iran’s Covert War
Against the United States
The Iranian attempt on the Saudi ambassador’s life
shows that Tehran is meaner and nastier than ever before. And no longer fears
U.S. military retaliation. says Brookings’ Ken Pollack. Plus, Eli
Lake on the escalating shadow war.
It’s shocking, but not entirely surprising to learn that the United States
government has evidence that the Iranian regime was trying to kill Saudi
Ambassador to the United States Adel al-Jubeir.
Of course, we need to be careful with this claim. It has not yet been
conclusively proven, and it would not be the first time that Iran was accused of
something it didn’t do. Nor would it be the first time that the U.S. government
was convinced of something that later turned out not to be entirely correct (see
“Iraqi WMD”).
That said, the confidence of the U.S. government in its claim is striking,
and if its contentions are borne out, it would represent a major escalation of
Iranian terrorist operations against the United States. That said, it would not
necessarily represent a radical departure from the trend in recent Iranian
foreign policy.
In particular, while this plot—a mass casualty attack on U.S. soil—would go
well beyond what Iran has attempted in the past, it would represent an
extrapolation of another pattern, namely the emergence of a more aggressive,
risk-tolerant Iranian regime over the past two years.
In 2009, Iran experienced its own version of the Arab Spring. In response to
the rigged re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, millions of Iranians took to the
streets in protest, demanding the end of the Islamic regime and the creation of
a new democracy in its place. Iran’s leaders briefly debated what to do before
Tehran’s hardline faction won out and the country’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei, ordered its powerful security apparatus to crush the
revolt.
The harder-line leadership has pursued a more aggressive, more recalcitrant, and
more anti-American foreign policy
Iranian policemen carry a portrait of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in a parade in
Tehran, in May 2011, Vahid Salemi / AP Photo
This crackdown was not only focused externally on the Iranian people,
however. At the same time, Khamenei
and other Iranian hardliners—particularly the leadership of the
Revolutionary Guard—also purged the government of its more moderate elements.
Pragmatists like former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani were sidelined or
ousted altogether, and the regime that emerged reflected the Iranian radical
perspective more than at any time since the 1980s.
Not surprisingly, this harder-line leadership has pursued a more aggressive,
more recalcitrant, and more anti-American foreign policy than at any time since
the early days of the revolution. Over the past two years, Iran has ramped up
its support for radical Shiite groups in Iraq, who have in turn stepped up their
attacks on Iraqi Sunnis, on more moderate Iraqi Shia, and on American troops. In
Afghanistan, Iran has provided more assistance and more lethal weaponry to the
Taliban, contributing to the rising U.S. and Afghan security-force death toll
there. Remarkably, despite the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution
1929—which imposed unexpectedly harsh sanctions on the regime for its refusal to
halt its nuclear program, causing widespread economic hardship in Iran—Tehran
thumbed its nose at international offers to negotiate an end to the nuclear
impasse. Meanwhile, the regime has steadfastly clung to its Syrian ally, backing
its slaughter of thousands of civilian protesters rather than give up its
dictatorship.
It is against this backdrop that we should weigh the possibility, as
suggested by the U.S. government claim, that Iran may have tried to kill the
Saudi ambassador to the United States by blowing up a restaurant on American
soil. If true, it would suggest three important things about Tehran’s thinking
that take us beyond what we already believed:
1. That the regime believes it is already locked in an undeclared covert war
with the United States—perhaps believing that the United States was behind the
Stuxnet virus that set back Iran’s nuclear program, as well as the killing of
several Iranian nuclear scientists on Iranian soil. Alternatively, the regime
may believe that the Israelis were behind those acts, but that the U.S. (and
Saudi Arabia) egged them on.
2. That the regime is willing to go way beyond anything it has ever done
before to strike blows against the United States in this war. For instance, in
the 1990s, the last time the regime (mistakenly) reached a similar conclusion,
the most it did was to detonate a truck bomb outside an American military
housing complex in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 American servicemen. The
Saudi-American tie was there in this attack as well, but at that time, the
Iranians stayed off American soil.
3. That the regime may no longer be concerned about a massive American
conventional military retaliation. In the past, that fear has been an important
restraint on Iranian action against the United States. Again, if true, this plot
suggests that the Iranians may believe either that the United States is so
consumed with its own internal problems and so determined to avoid another war
in the Middle East that the American people would not countenance any action
that might risk escalation with Iran. Alternatively, it may suggest that Iran
believes its nuclear program is far enough along to deter conventional American
military retaliation.
Each of these would be troubling in its own right. It's why it is so
important to substantiate both the plot, and its connection to Iran. Because if
it is valid, it represents a very significant set of steps in the wrong
direction for Iranian strategy.
Nevertheless, even if the claim is shown to be valid, we should not assume
that this means that Iran is an irrational nation hell-bent on harming Americans
at any cost, as it is sometimes depicted in the Western press. Even after the
2009 purge, the Tehran regime is not Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which was recklessly
aggressive to the point of inadvertent suicide. But, if this incredible claim is
proven true, it should remind us that Iran also is not a normal country by any
stretch of the imagination, and that in a Middle East already in turmoil we now
face a more aggressive, more risk-taking Iran that may be looking to stir the
pot in ways that it once found imprudent.
The quiet war erupts
Iranian agents accused of plotting assault on U.S. soil
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Iran has
engaged in a slow escalation of conflict against the U.S. (Atta Kenare, AFP/Getty
Images / October 12, 2011)
October 12,
2011
For years, Iran has quietly waged
war against the U.S., allying with and arming this nation's enemies. Now that
war has come to U.S. soil.
Attorney General Eric
Holder said Tuesday that federal authorities have foiled a plot by men
linked to the Iranian government to kill the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the
United States by exploding a bomb, possibly at a Washington, D.C.,
restaurant
This chilling news caps a long, slow, deliberate escalation of Iranian
provocation:
• Iran's elite military unit, the Revolutionary Guards,
armed its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan to target
U.S. troops and accelerate the U.S.
military withdrawal. U.S. defense officials say Iranian-supplied weapons
have killed U.S. soldiers.
• Iranian speedboats have challenged U.S. and
allied warships in the Persian Gulf, setting up a series of near-collisions. The
U.S. response? An overture to Iran, to set up a military-to-military hotline to
defuse such clashes. Tehran's
answer: Forget it.
• American officials say Iran has forged an alliance
with al-Qaida,
allowing the terrorist organization safe passage to send cash, arms and fighters
to its operations in Pakistan and
Afghanistan.
• Iran has armed the terrorists of Hamas in Gaza
and dispatched thousands of rockets to Hezbollah terrorists in Lebanon, posing a
direct threat to Israel, a key U.S. ally.
A quiet, largely client-based
war. But this war is no longer quiet.
Holder called the plot "an
international conspiracy by elements of the Iranian government."
Holder
said the two men charged, Manssor Arbabsiar and Gholam Shakuri, are connnected
to the Quds Force, a division of the Revolutionary Guards, the power behind
Iran's ruling mullahs. Arbabsiar was arrested and reportedly provided details of
the plot, but Shakuri is still at large.
"In addition to holding these
individual conspirators accountable for their alleged role in this plot, the
United States is committed to holding Iran accountable for its actions," he
said.
So what will the U.S. response be? How will the U.S. hold Iran
accountable? By slapping on more economic sanctions? By rushing out a furious
diplomatic cable?
Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism. We should learn
more about how complicit its leaders were in this attempt to stage a terrorist
attack in the U.S. that would have targeted an ally and most likely claimed U.S.
lives.
Iran continues to develop a nuclear program. It is a state sponsor
of terrorism with a determination to go nuclear. Round after round of economic
sanctions haven't deterred Iran, which is closer to atomic bomb-building
capability. The Iranians may have conducted experimental work to develop
warheads to deliver nuclear payloads.
And now, it appears, Iranian agents
were plotting to launch an assault in Washington. The war has come home.
The US case accuses the Quds Force of being behind the plot:
such an act would have required a direct order from Iran's supreme leader,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Photograph: Rouzbeh Jadidoleslam/AP
It is important to keep in mind that grandiose
plots straight out of Hollywood – foreign governments, Mexican drug cartels and
government informants – are typically higher on aspiration than actual
capability. However, the alleged
active involvement of the Quds Force, which is connected at the hip with the
Iranian leadership, is – if true – a serious development. How high up the
Iranian hierarchy is unknowable – not unlike Pakistan and its knowledge of the
whereabouts of Osama bin Laden – but it is a safe assumption that there was at
least some government complicity in the plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to the
United States, Adel al-Jubeir. But why?
A rogue plot? Perhaps, but if successful, it would be a strike at a near
enemy – and one of that enemy's best friends.
The Saudis (the near enemy) and Iranians are locked
in a pitched contest for geopolitical primacy in the Gulf. Saudi concern about
the rise of Iran and its nuclear program
matches that of Israel.
Broader changes in the neighborhood have heightened
the regional stakes. In Syria, embattled leader Bashir
al-Assad is an Iranian client. The emergence of a Sunni-led government in Syria
would be the most significant development in this time of remarkable Arab
transitions. The Saudis and Iranians have other political tugs of war underway
in Bahrain, Yemen and Iraq.
Obviously, the second shoe would be embarrassment to the United States, which
has an international responsibility under the Vienna Conventions to protect the
diplomatic corps in Washington, not to mention a well-regarded and respected
ambassador of a close friend.
It's unclear how much Iran would stand to gain by sanctioning or supporting
this plot. It is true that US-Saudi relations have some existing stresses – the
Saudi monarchy believes that the Obama administration tossed another close
friend, former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, over the side earlier this
year. Perhaps the Iranians were thinking that additional sand in the gears of
the US-Saudi friendship can't hurt. Again, who knows?
If official Iranian sponsorship is proved, what should the United States and
the international community do in response?
Iran long ago earned its membership on the US list of state sponsors of
terror – it has used surrogates against targets in this hemisphere before. There
remains no easy military action regarding the full range of concerns about Iran,
from its support for terrorism to its pursuit of nuclear know-how.
Through effective action by both the Bush and Obama administrations, there
have been multiple rounds of sanctions in recent years. As a result, countries
and companies around the world have reduced levels of business dealings with
Iran. For any multinational corporation, the reputational costs of doing
business in Iran – or even doing business with someone else who does business
with Iran – have grown.
There should be a new opportunity to sanction an expanded universe of
individuals and entities, and perhaps broader categories of economic activity
linked to the Iranian government and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. More
can be done to isolate Iran, and further action by European and Asian countries
will be essential.
Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton said Tuesday that the plot will give the United
States additional leverage in dealing with Iran. The real leverage may rest with
Saudi Arabia, with a
powerful commercial weapon it can use with an array of countries that have
hedged their dealings with Iran in the past. For example, Saudi Arabia can have
a blunt conversation with an emerging power like China, with which Saudi Arabia
has growing commercial ties. China, as evidenced by its veto of a UN security
council resolution last week condemning Syria for using extreme violence against
its people, prefers not to mix international politics and business.
Call it Saudi Arabia's "with us or against us" moment. Business as usual is
no longer an acceptable answer.
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