Wednesday, May 23, 2012

Don't expose Muslim atrocities




WND EXCLUSIVE

MSNBC: Don't expose Muslim atrocities

Harvard professor doesn't want 'fuel' against Islam revealed




 MSNBC’s new golden girl was in a pickle: If someone sees a black person committing rape or domestic violence, should he report it if it makes black people look bad?

Or if Muslims see wife-beating, genital mutilation and childhood sexual abuse, should they just keep it to themselves, because saying something gives ammunition to the “Islamophobes”?
The questions appear to be simple. But they posed a challenge for the host of the new “Melissa Harris-Perry” show when guest Mona Eltahawy talked about her Foreign Policy magazine cover story about abuse of women by men in the Muslim world.
Eltahawy speaks from experience: She had her arms broken in a demonstration in Egypt and was tortured and raped in an Egyptian jail cell.
So she seemed surprised to find Harris-Perry questioning her right to draw attention to “traditions” such as involuntary female circumcision, wife-beating and childhood sexual abuse.
“I start with a little bit of trepidation in this conversation,” the host said, “in part because I know some of the critiques of this. The very idea that Western press, those that are not from these nations, who are not Muslim ourselves, who are not part of these traditions can look at your article and say ‘ahhh, look at how horrible those men, or those societies, or that religion is.’
“And that is part of the reason why, for example, we have an under-reporting of rape and domestic violence in African American communities,” Harris-Perry continued. “Because we know the violence enacted on black men by police, so we often don’t call. Right?”
Then the MSNBC host brought in Harvard professor Leila Ahmed, who questioned whether Eltahawy should have written the article at all. Not because it was false, but because it made Muslims look bad.
“You began, Melissa, by noting that some things in the African-American community are not publicized precisely because of the racism,” said Ahmed as Harris-Perry nodded in agreement on a split screen.
“Mona, I appreciate what you do,” continued Ahmed. “I would love it if – I understand if you want to get your message across. It’s an important message. But if possible [you should not] give fuel, fodder to people who simply hate Arabs and Muslims in this climate of our day.”
See the interview:




Eltahawy seemed taken aback.
“That’s the whole point,” she said. “It’s not me that makes Muslims look bad. It’s those atrocities that make Muslims look bad. And as a writer, it’s my job to poke the painful places.”
Harris-Perry declined to respond to a subsequent email asking if she ever refused to report a violent crime because it would make someone look bad.
Eltahawy pointed out that deposed Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak oppressed the nation for 30 years, until his removal last year. She said “Mubarak” still needs to be removed from Egyptian minds and bedrooms.
The society that emphasizes Islam, she said, continues to “oppress women,” citing a statement from Saudi Arabia on the day her article was released saying that 10-year-old girls are “ready for marriage.”
“That’s outrageous,” Eltawy said.
She explained she wanted to go “straight for the jugular” and reveal misogyny in religion, culture and the law, and demand an answer.
“What are we going to do about that?” she asked.
Life under Shariah
Former Iowa Republican Congressman Fred Grandy, now with the Center for Security Policy, described what life is like for women under Islamic law, or Shariah, in an interview with “PolitiChicks.”




  Grandy said there are a number of cases in which Muslim women, even in the United States, have been abused under Islamic law.
They include a case in which a judge concluded it essentially was a Muslim man’s right to beat and assault his wife. In another case, a Muslim woman who had fled Pakistan was forced by a U.S. judge to send her child back to Pakistan, because the father claimed it was his right to have the child.
Further appeals, the judge ruled, would be in Pakistan. When the mother argued that she could be accused of crimes and sentenced to death if she returned to Pakistan to fight for her child, the judge concluded, essentially, that it was her problem.
Colin Flaherty is an award-winning reporter whose work has appeared in more than 1,000 media outlets around the world, including the Washington Post, New York Times, Los Angeles Times and WND. His critically acclaimed book, “White Girl Bleed a Lot: The Return of Racial Violence to America and How The Media Ignore It,” is in its second edition and available in paperback and e-book at Amazon, Barnes & Noble and other popular outlets.


Top 20 Cases


KEY:


RATING: Shariah Involvement Score:
Highly Relevant: Shariah represents a clear conflict of law with Constitutional principles
or state public policy
Relevant: Significant elements of Shariah are involved
TRIAL: Trial Court Shariah Compliance Outcome Review:
Yes: TCSY
No: TCSN
Indeterminate: TCSI
Not Applicable: TCSNA
APPEAL: Appeals Court Shariah Compliance Outcome Review:
Yes: ACSY
No: ACSN
Indeterminate: ACSI
Not Applicable: ACSNA

1. S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).

Shariah: Highly Relevant TCSY; ACSN
S.D. (wife) and M.J.R. (husband) were both Muslims and citizens of Morocco and both resided in New Jersey. After only three months of marriage, husband began physically abusing wife. The physical abuse administered by husband injured wife’s entire body including her breasts and pubic area. Additionally, husband forced himself on wife and had non-consensual sex with her on multiple occasions. Husband stated to wife that Islam allowed him to have sex
with her at any time he wished.
Wife asked the trial court to grant a restraining order against husband shortly after he verbally divorced her in front of their imam. The trial court refused to issue a final restraining order against husband finding that, although husband had harassed and assaulted wife, husband believed it was his religious right to have non-consensual sex with his wife and that belief precluded any criminal intent on the part of husband. The New Jersey appellate court reversed the trial court and ordered that the trial court enter a final restraining order against husband.
The New Jersey appellate court stated that the trial court erroneously allowed the husband’s religious beliefs to excuse him from New Jersey’s criminal code and that husband knowingly engaged in non-consensual sex with wife.

2. Hosain v. Malik, 671 A. 2d 988 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).

Shariah: Highly Relevant TCSY; ACSY
Hosain (wife) and Malik (husband) lived in Pakistan as a married couple for approximately eight years before Hosain fled to the United States with the couple’s daughter. Malik filed for custody of their daughter in a Pakistani court. Hosain did not appear before the Pakistani court because she would have been arrested in Pakistan for adultery because she lived with a man after she fled to the United States. The Pakistani court granted custody to Malik. Malik requested that American courts recognize and enforce the Pakistani custody order via a mechanism known as comity. A Maryland trial court granted comity to the Pakistani custody order. On appeal, the Maryland appellate court affirmed the trial court and granted comity to the Pakistani custody order holding that the Pakistani court considered the best interests of the child in granting custody to Malik. However, the minority opinion disagreed that the Pakistani court considered the child’s best interest and instead focused on factors outside of the “best interests of the child” analysis. These other factors included that the child would live in an “un-Islamic” society if it were allowed to remain with Hosain in the United States.

3. In re Marriage of Obaidi, 227 P. 3d 787 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).

Shariah: Highly Relevant TCSY; ACSN
Qayoum (husband) and Obaidi (wife) signed a pre-marital agreement known as a “mahr” which was written in Farsi. Husband was a U.S. citizen; had little understanding of any culture outside of America; and did not speak, read, or write Farsi. The contents of the mahr required that husband pay wife $20,000 at some future date, but husband was not advised about the mahr’s contents until after he had signed it. A few months after the couple signed the mahr, they were married in an Islamic wedding; and later they were wed in a civil ceremony. Several months after the civil ceremony, wife was kicked out of the couple’s residence and filed for divorce in Washington state court.
The trial court found the mahr enforceable and awarded wife $20,000 per the terms of the mahr. The trial court noted that husband initiated the divorce without good cause; and therefore, was liable, per Islamic law, to pay the amount due under the mahr. The Washington appellate court held that the trial court erred by looking to Islamic law; and instead should have applied neutral principles of law to determine whether the mahr was enforceable. The appellate court stated that under neutral principles of law (Washington contract law) the parties must agree on the essential terms of a contract in order for the contract to be enforceable.
Applying this neutral principle of law, the appellate court held the mahr was unenforceable because the parties never agreed why or when the $20,000 would be due.

4. Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A. 2d 1000 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).

Shariah: Highly Relevant TCSN; ACSY
Husband and wife were both Pakistani citizens. Wife filed for divorce in a New Jersey court alleging that her husband had abandoned her. Husband answered the divorce suit by stating that he had already been granted a divorce under Pakistani law; and thus, the trial court was without jurisdiction to divide the marital estate. The trial court ruled that Pakistani law violated New Jersey public policy because of its gross bias against the wife. The trial judge invalidated the Pakistani divorce and ordered husband to pay spousal maintenance to wife.
The New Jersey appellate court did not show much concern regarding whether the Pakistani divorce court offended New Jersey public policy. Instead, the appellate court held that the trial court should have recognized the Pakistani divorce and should not have ordered husband to pay spousal maintenance to wife because the couple’s Islamic pre-marital agreement did not provide for spousal maintenance and did not allow wife to take an interest in husband’s property. The appellate court stated that the pre-marital agreement was freely negotiated, but apparently ignored the fact that the couple’s parents negotiated the agreement and the wife had no role in negotiating the pre-marital agreement that would cause her to be without spousal maintenance and without an interest in marital assets acquired by husband.

5. Tarikonda v. Pinjari, No. 287403 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).

Shariah: Highly Relevant TCSY; ACSN
Tarikonda (wife) and Pinjari (husband) were married in India in 2001. In April 2008, Pinjari obtained an Islamic summary divorce known as talaq against Tarikonda. In May 2008, Tarikonda, possibly without knowing about the talaq, filed for divorce in Michigan. Pinjari filed a motion requesting that the Michigan trial court recognize the talaq divorce and dismiss Tarikonda’s divorce complaint. The trial court granted comity to the talaq Pinjari pronounced in India and dismissed Tarikonda’s complaint. The Michigan appellate court reversed the trial court holding that talaq violated Tarikonda’s right to due process because: (a) she had no prior notice of the talaq pronouncement; (b) she had no right to be present at the pronouncement and did not have an attorney; and (c) the talaq provided no opportunity for a hearing. The Michigan appellate court also held that talaq violates equal protection because women do not also enjoy the right to pronounce talaq. Additionally, the Michigan appellate court held that talaq violates Michigan public policy because, upon divorce, Islamic law allows women to recover only the property that is in their names while Michigan law provides for an equitable division of the marital estate.

6. Karson v. Soleimani, Nos. B216360, B219698 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).

Shariah: Highly Relevant TCSY; ACSN
Kioumars Ardakani, a life-long resident of Iran, was estranged from his second wife, Soleimani, when he died in Iran without leaving a will. Karson was Ardakani’s daughter from a previous marriage and was Soleimani’s stepdaughter. Karson was a Muslim and both Ardakani and Soleimani were of the Bahai faith. Ardakani’s estate included three parcels of real property in Iran. Karson filed suit in a California court alleging that Soleimani, Soleimani’s attorney in Iran, and other family members who lived in Iran defrauded Karson out of her interest in her father’s estate. Soleimani filed a motion to dismiss Karson’s suit on the basis that Iran was a more convenient forum to try the case than was California. The trial court found that Iran was a more suitable forum to hear Karson’s suit and granted Soleimani’s motion to dismiss. The California appellate court reversed the trial court and ordered Karson’s suit be heard in California. The appellate court held that Iran was not an appropriate forum because Iranian law did not protect the parties’ due process rights and discriminated against women and religious minorities such as the Bahai.

7. Nationwide Resources Corp. v. Massabni, Massabni, and Zouheil, 143 Ariz. 460, 694 P.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1984).

Shariah: Highly Relevant TCSY; ACSN
After obtaining a judgment against Defendants Bertha and Fadlo Massabni and Pierre Zouheil, Plaintiff Nationwide brought an action to garnish a promissory note for monies owed to Defendant Zouheil. Mr. Zouheil claimed that the promissory note was community property belonging to him and his wife (both Syrian Christians); and therefore not subject to garnishment by Nationwide. Nationwide contended that the promissory note was the separate property of only Mr. Zouheil and subject to garnishment. The trial court, following Nationwide’s suggestion, applied Moroccan Islamic law to determine the nature of the promissory note as separate or community property despite the fact that the Zouheils were neither Muslims nor Moroccan citizens. In reviewing the trial court’s decision, the Arizona appellate court applied Syrian Christian law and determined that the promissory note was Defendant Zouheil’s separate property. The application of Syrian Christian law, which does not allow couples to acquire community property simply by virtue of the existence of their marriage, directly conflicted with Arizona law which starts with the presumption that all property acquired by either spouse during marriage is community property.

8. In re Custody of R., minor child, No. 21565-9-II (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).

Shariah: Highly Relevant TCSY; ACSN
Mr. Noordin and Ms. Abdulla had a child, R., out of wedlock, but were later married in Malaysia. Neither Mr. Noordin nor Ms. Abdulla were citizens of the United States. While the couple was residing in the Philippines, Ms. Abdulla filed for an annulment in Philippine civil court; and Mr. Noordin was granted talaq, or Islamic divorce, and given custody of R. by a Sharia court in the Philippines. Subsequently, the Philippine civil court ruled that the Sharia court lacked jurisdiction, granted custody of R. to Ms. Abdulla, and allowed her to take R. out of the country. Ms. Abdulla took R. to the United States without notifying Mr. Noordin. Mr. Noordin later moved to the United States, filed an action in Washington state court, requested that the Sharia court’s ruling be enforced, and asked the court to give him custody of R. The trial court showed little patience in working through the issue of whether the Sharia court had jurisdiction to decide who should be R.’s custodian, enforced the Sharia court’s ruling, and gave Mr. Noordin custody of R. The Washington appellate court reversed the trial court and ordered the trial court to determine whether the Sharia court had jurisdiction to determine R.’s custodian. The Washington appellate court also stated that if the Sharia court had jurisdiction to determine R.’s custodian, Ms. Abdulla could challenge the Sharia court’s order by proving that the Sharia court’s proceedings violated Washington public policy or that the foreign court did not consider the best interests of the child when it awarded custody.

9. Tazziz v. Tazziz, No. 88-P-941 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988).

Shariah: Highly Relevant TCSY; ACSNI
Ismail Tazziz (father) and Pamela Tazziz (mother) lived together as husband and wife in East Jerusalem for 22 years. The father was a Jordanian citizen with an Israeli ID card; and the mother was a dual citizen of Jordan and the United States and had an Israeli ID card. The couple had several minor children. All of the couple’s minor children were United States citizens by virtue of being born abroad to an American mother. The mother took three of the couple’s minor children to Massachusetts without the father’s consent and filed suit in Massachusetts for custody of the minor children. Two months after the mother filed for custody in Massachusetts, the father filed for custody in an Israeli Sharia court. The Massachusetts trial court dismissed the mother’s complaint without considering the best interests of the children. The trial court appeared to not realize that it had discretion to hear the mother’s suit for custody. The appellate court sent the mother’s case back to the trial court and instructed the trial court to consider a variety of factors in order to protect the children’s interests and to evaluate whether the Sharia court would consider the best interests of the children when awarding custody.

10. Rhodes v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 9 Mass. L. Rptr. 355 (Mass. 1999).

Shariah: Highly Relevant TCSN; ACSNA
Plaintiff Rhodes, a non-Muslim woman, was on vacation at a Sheraton resort in Jeddah, Saudia Arabia, and suffered severe spinal injuries after she dove into the resort’s lagoon and hit her head on a coral structure. Plaintiff filed her suit in a Maryland court for her injuries. Defendant ITT Sheraton requested that the Maryland court dismiss Plaintiff’s suit, under a mechanism called forum non conveniens, because Saudi Arabia represented a more convenient forum in which to try the suit. The Massachusetts court refused to dismiss Plaintiff’s suit and deemed Saudi Arabia an inadequate forum because, among other deficiencies, Saudi law, which is the application of Sharia as the law of the land, exhibits a systemic bias against women and non-Muslims.

11. Abd Alla v. Mourssi, 680 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).

Shariah: Highly Relevant TCSY; ACSY
Abd Alla and Mourssi entered into a partnership agreement. Included in the terms of the partnership agreement was a clause whereby both parties agreed to submit any disputes arising out of the partnership agreement to Islamic arbitration. A dispute arose between the two parties and the disagreement was submitted to an Islamic arbitration committee. Following the arbitration committee’s ruling on the dispute, Abd Alla asked a district court to confirm the arbitration decision. Abd Allah also argued that Mourssi had not timely contested the arbitration committee’s decision. Mourssi alleged that the arbitration decision should be vacated because, Mourssi alleged, the committee exceeded its authority and the arbitration award was obtained by corruption, fraud, and undue means. The trial court confirmed the Islamic arbitration committee’s decision. The Minnesota appellate court held that district court properly confirmed the arbitration committee’s ruling. The Minnesota appellate court said that Mourssi did not contest the arbitration committee’s ruling in the timeframe required by Minnesota law. Moreover, the appellate court stated that Mourssi did not establish that the arbitration ruling was obtained as a result of fraud or other undue means which would have allowed Mourssi, under Minnesota law, to vacate the arbitration committee’s decision.

12. El-Farra v. Sayyed, et al., 226 S.W.3d 792 (Ark. 2006).

Shariah: Highly Relevant TCSN; ACSN
The Islamic Center of Little Rock (Center) hired El-Farra to serve as the Center’s imam in January 2001. On May 15, 2003 and May 30, 2003, person responsible for the Center’s governance sent El-Farra disciplinary letters advising El-Farra that his sermons were inaccurate and inappropriate. Additionally, the disciplinary letters accused El-Farra of creating disunity and other misconduct that was contrary to Islamic law. In July 2003, El-Farra was fired and paid sixty days salary as required by the terms of his contract with the Center. El-Farra sued for breach of contract, defamation, and tortious interference with a contract. The trial court ruled the First Amendment prohibited the courts from hearing El-Farra’s claims and dismissed the suit. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the trial court’s dismissal of El-Farra’s suit was proper on First Amendment grounds because the claims made by El-Farra could not have been decided by neutral principles of law, but instead would have required the court to determine the propriety of El-Farra’s termination by inquiring into Islamic law.

13. In re Marriage of Malak, 182 Cal. App. 3d 1018 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).

Shariah: Highly Relevant TCSN; ACSY
Laila (wife) and Abdul (husband) Malak, both Lebanese nationals, were married in 1970. Laila and Abdul moved to the UAE in 1976 to escape Lebanon’s civil war. In July 1982, Laila moved to California and took the couple’s two children with her without Abdul’s consent. Laila filed for divorce and custody of the couple’s two children in California court in September 1982. Abdul obtained a preliminary order from a Lebanese Sharia court awarding him custody of the couple’s two children on February 8, 1983. Laila was personally served with the order on May 26, 1983. Laila was required to respond to the Sharia court within 15 days of being personally served if she wanted to oppose the Sharia court’s preliminary order. She failed to file an opposition within 15 days; and the Sharia court’s preliminary custody order became final on June 30, 1983. Abdul filed the Sharia court’s final order and requested that the California courts enforce the order. The trial court refused to enforce the Sharia court’s order, in part, because the trial court did not believe that the children’s best interests were considered by the Lebanese Sharia court.
The California appellate court ordered that the Sharia court’s custody orders be enforced and that Abdul be given custody of the two children. The California appellate court appeared to defer to the Sharia court’s analysis of what was in the children’s best interests rather than make an independent assessment of the best interests of the children. For example, the California appellate court did not comment on or challenge the Sharia court’s finding that the couple’s children had many friends in Lebanon despite the fact that the children had spent all or almost all of their lives outside of Lebanon in the UAE or America. The Sharia court’s analysis emphasized that Abdul, the children’s father, was a Muslim and that Lebanon, Abdul’s then place of residence, would allow them to receive an Islamic education.

14. In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).

Shariah: Highly Relevant TCSN; ACSN
Ahmad (husband) and Sherifa (wife) were married in Egypt in 1974; moved to the United States in the early 1980s; and filed for divorce in 1998. Ahmad argued that a document signed by him and Sharifa’s father, as her proxy, constituted the parties’ pre-marital agreement to have Islamic law govern any property settlement following a divorce. The document recited that the marriage had been concluded in accordance with Islamic law and that the two parties were aware of the legal implications of the marriage. The trial court found the document was not a prenuptial agreement, but instead was a marriage certificate. The trial court applied California law to the division of property. The appellate court recognized that the document was vague about the material terms to which the husband and wife were allegedly agreeing, that there are multiple schools of Islamic legal thought that could govern the agreement, and that no particular school of Islamic legal thought was selected by the parties. The appellate court held that the pre-marital document did not provide sufficient information about the parties’ agreement to constitute a valid pre-marital agreement. As a result of the appellate court’s holding, California law was applied to the property division and the wife took an interest in the marital property. The wife would have accumulated no interest in these assets under Islamic law since property acquired by a spouse during marriage remains that spouse’s separate property.

15. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yanu Petrochem. Co., Inc. and Exxon Chem. Arabia, Inc., 866 A. 2d (Del. 2005).

Shariah: Highly Relevant TCSY; ACSY
Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) entered into two joint venture agreements— one with Mobil and the other with Exxon. Both joint venture contracts provided that the parties’ only source of profits would be from the operations of the joint ventures. The contracts further provided that the parties would pass-through costs to the joint venture entities—without mark-up—for any technologies that were purchased from a third party and then sublicensed to the joint ventures. However, in the year 2000, ExxonMobile discovered that SABIC had procured technology from Union Carbide, sublicensed the technology to both joint venture entities, and overcharged both joint ventures for the technology that SABIC had sub-licensed to the joint ventures. Exxon and Mobile sued SABIC alleging that the overcharges were a breach of the joint venture agreements and a violation of the Saudi law against usurpation (ghasb). After consulting with five experts on Saudi Arabian law to determine how the law of usurpation (ghasb) would be applied in Saudi Arabia, the trial court applied Saudi law and found SABIC liable for usurpation and breach of the joint venture agreements. The trial court awarded $416 million to Exxon and Mobile on their usurpation claim, $324 million of which were “enhanced” damages. On appeal, SABIC argued that the trial court failed to properly study and understand Saudi law; and thus, erroneously instructed the jury on the Saudi law of usurpation (ghasb). The appellate court noted that the trial court engaged in a meticulous effort to understand Islamic law as it would have been applied in Saudi Arabia and that the trial court properly considered expert testimony regarding the law of usurpation (ghasb) as it would have been applied in Saudi Arabia. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment against SABIC.

16. Akileh v. Elchahal, 660 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).

Shariah: Highly Relevant TCSN; ACSY
Akileh (wife), her father, and Elchahal (husband) agreed that, in return for Akileh’s hand in marriage, Elchahal would enter into an antenuptial agreement called a “sadaq.” Under the terms of the sadaq, Elchahal was to pay Akileh $50,001—$1 was paid immediately and the remaining $50,000 was deferred to an uncertain, later date. After the sadaq was signed, Akileh and Elchahal were married in December 1991. In 1993, Akileh filed for divorce after she contracted a venereal condition from Elchahal. The issue of whether Elchahal was liable to pay the remaining $50,000 to Akileh under the terms of the sadaq was to be decided at the couple’s divorce trial. Akileh testified it was her understanding that the wife forfeits her sadaq only if she cheats on her husband. Elchahal testified that he believed the sadaq is forfeited if the wife initiates the divorce. The trial court ruled that the sadaq was unenforceable because the parties had failed to agree on the sadaq’s essential terms. The trial court further stated that if the parties had agreed on the essential terms of the sadaq, then the court would essentially agree with Elchahal’s version of when the sadaq is forfeited and not order Elchahal to pay the deferred amount because the court would find that the purpose of the sadaq was to “protect the wife from an unwanted divorce.” Under the trial court’s ruling, Akileh would forfeit the deferred $50,000 because she initiated the divorce. The appellate court held that the sadaq was enforceable and the terms of the sadaq required Elchahal to pay the deferred portion to Akileh upon divorce. The appellate court ordered the trial court to enter judgment in Akileh’s favor.

17. Aleem v. Aleem, 404 Md. 404, 947 A.2d 489 (Md. 2008).

Shariah: Highly Relevant TCSN; ACSN
Husband and wife, both originally from Pakistan, were married in Pakistan in 1980. Shortly thereafter, the couple moved to Maryland where they resided 20 years prior to their divorce. The husband was in the United States on a diplomatic visa. The wife had obtained green card status. The wife initiated a divorce action in a Maryland court; and while the action was pending, the husband went to the Pakistani embassy and obtained an instantaneous divorce under Islamic law known as talaq. Talaq, under the law of Pakistan, would have resulted in the wife not acquiring any rights in the property accumulated by her husband during their marriage. Under Maryland law, she would have acquired marital property rights to assets titled in the husband’s name. The lower courts refused to recognize the talaq. The lower appellate court refused to recognize talaq as being contrary to Maryland public policy because of the extreme differences between Maryland and Pakistani law regarding marital property rights. The Maryland Supreme Court also refused to grant comity to the husband’s talaq because talaq violated Maryland’s public policy. Talaq violated gender equality promoted by Maryland’s constitution because talaq was available only the husband and not the wife. Moreover, talaq violated a wife’s due process rights because a wife could file for divorce in a Maryland court and the husband could obtain the instantaneous talaq before the wife had an opportunity to fully litigate the divorce filed by her in Maryland court. Talaq also would deprive the wife of the marital property rights that she held under Maryland law.

18. In re Marriage of Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).

Shariah: Highly Relevant TCSY; ACSN
Fereshteh, a Shiite woman, performed what she believed to be a valid muta (or temporary Shiite marriage) ceremony between herself and Speros Vryonis, a member of the Greek Orthodox faith. For two and one-half years following the muta ceremony, the two never told friends that they were married, they lived at separate locations, they spent only a few nights together during any given month, Speros continued to date other women, and Fereshteh was aware that he was dating other women. After Speros told Fereshteh that he was going to marry another woman, she told others—for the first time—that she and Speros were married. After Speros married the other woman, Fereshteh filed for divorce. Fereshteh claimed that she had a good faith belief that she and Speros were married; and that her good faith belief in their alleged marriage entitled her to spousal support and property rights as a putative spouse under California law. The California Court of Appeals held that a person could not successfully claim that he or she is a putative spouse by virtue of having performed a muta ceremony because muta is insufficient to allow a person to form a good faith belief that he or she had entered into a legal California marriage.

19. In re Marriage of Donboli, No. 53861-6-I (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).

Shariah: Highly Relevant TCSN; ACSN
Husband and wife held dual American-Iranian citizenship and lived in America when they gave birth to a child in 2000. In late 2001 while the couple and their child were in Iran, the husband beat his wife so severely that she required a two-week stay in the hospital. Shortly after the altercation, husband served wife with divorce papers while both of them and their child were still in Iran. Husband also took the passports that belonged to his wife and child. With some degree of effort and assistance from a foreign embassy, wife obtained replacement passports for herself and the child in early 2002 and was able to return to the United States. In late March 2002, wife filed a petition for divorce and child custody in the state of Washington. Husband filed for custody in Iranian court; and in October 2002, the Iranian court awarded custody of the child to husband. In June 2003, a Washington family court declined to enforce the Iranian custody order. The appellate court also refused to enforce the Iranian custody order. The appellate court held that enforcing the Iranian custody order would violate Washington public policy because (a) the wife had no notice or opportunity to be heard at the Iranian custody hearing and (b) Iranian child custody law did not consider the best interests of the child when awarding custody as required by Washington law.

20. Farah v. Farah, 429 S.E.2d 626 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).

Shariah: Highly Relevant TCSY; ACSN
Ahmed Farah was a citizen of Algeria; Naima Mansur was a citizen of Pakistan; both were Muslims. Proxies of Ahmed and Naima met in London to conduct a ceremony that bound Ahmed and Naima as husband and wife according to Islamic law. The ceremony did not conform to the formalities required of marriages by English law. Following the ceremony in London, the couple went to Pakistan where Naima’s father held a “Rukhsati” reception for the couple. Following the reception, the couple returned to Virginia where they resided. They never had a civil marriage performed for them in the United States although they intended to do so. Less than one year after the proxy ceremony in London, the couple separated. Ahmed filed an action to have the marriage declared void; Naima filed a divorce action. Ahmed contended that he and Naima were not legally married because the London ceremony did not adhere to the formalities required by English law; and therefore, their marriage was void. Naima argued that the marriage was legal in Pakistan because the proxy ceremony in London was valid under Islamic law, the marriage was completed in Pakistan, and Pakistan recognizes valid Islamic marriages.
The trial court found that a valid marriage existed because the London proxy ceremony was valid under Islamic law and the law of Pakistan. The trial court reasoned that Virginia should grant comity and recognize the marriage because it was valid under the laws of a state—Pakistan. The appellate court reversed the trial court and held that the marriage was invalid. The validity of a marriage in Virginia, said the appellate court, is dependent on whether the marriage was valid in the place where the ceremony occurred; not whether the marriage was religiously valid under Islamic law. 
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